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La Sapienza
AN OVERVIEW OF MAJOR MICROSOCIOLOGICAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE FIELD OF 
SOCIOLOGY OF COMMUNICATION
Pregled glavnih mikrosocioloških doprinosa 
u polju Sociologije komunikacije
ABSTRACT: Communication as a basic and ubiquitous phenomenon for social 
life is part of the researcher’s interest in almost every field of social science and 
especially in sociology, psychology and communication studies. In doing so, each 
scientific discipline apprehends communication from the perspective of the method 
it employs and from the researchers’ imagination and theoretical preferences, which 
is mainly based on locally acquired knowledge and experiences. In this article we 
will focus our attention on the most important aspects and perspectives set forth by 
sociological theorization and analysis.
KEYWORDS: Social action, communicative action, symbolic interactionism, 
phenomenology, ethnomethodology
APSTRAKT: Komunikacija kao osnovna i sveprisutna pojava u društvenom 
životu je deo istraživačkih interesovanja u gotovo svakom polju društvenih nauka, 
a posebno u sociologiji, psihologiji i komunikologiji. Realizujući ova istraživanja, 
svaka naučna disciplina obuhvata komunikaciju iz perspektive svog metoda i iz 
istraživačeve imaginacije i teorijske preferencije, što je uglavnom zasnovano na 
lokalno stečenom znanju i iskustvu. U ovom članku svoju pažnju koncentrišemo 
na najvažnije aspekte i perspektive koje su zadale sociološka teorija i analiza.
KLJUČNE REČI: društvena akcija, komunikacijska akcija, simbolički interakci-
onizam, fenomenologija, etnometodologija
Introduction
Modern sociology analyzes communication as a constitutive and binding 
element of society, seen as an organized structure of individuals and isolated 
social actors. The way communication enables the constitution, functioning and 
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interpretation of social life is one of the central topics of interest in sociology. But 
awareness of the importance of communication in researching social life has not 
always existed. This awareness is socially conditioned, has developed along with 
the increasing significance of microsociology at the expense of macrosociology 
and has grown from the beginnings of the 20th century to the present. The 
classical concept of social action developed in the 1920s can be considered as 
the fundamental idea fostering the divergence between these two competing 
perspectives in the study of social reality. In developing this concept, Max Weber 
proposed that social action should be the basic subject of sociological research, 
and that the constituting elements of social life, including communication, 
should be seen as form of social action. Hence the interest of sociologists to 
research communication as social action.
Communication as social action
As is well known, social action is an action taken by social actors, which 
takes into account other members of society and is directed towards them 
(Weber 1978: 4). Action that is not aimed at others or which does not take into 
account other social actors cannot be considered a social action. Social action 
is an active part of social reality. It is an initiative part of social dynamics. As 
Turner (2006: 1) notes, jumping is a social action, while being pushed is a social 
event. Social action includes the registration of the behavior of other social 
actors, as well as the subjective interpretation given to them, and hence social 
action has a reflexive dimension (Kalberg 2003: 142). In particular, it is an action 
in accordance with the interpretations of social actors and events. Social action 
involves the anticipation of the events and behaviors of the past, but it also 
projects onto expected and desired future events and behaviors of social actors. 
Accordingly, social action can be motivated by the expectation and projection of 
past, present and future events and behaviors of other social actors.
Sociologists see communication as a social action that is aimed at mutual 
understanding with other social actors through the exchange of symbols (Mead 
1934; Habermas 1983). Every communication is a social action, but every 
social action does not necessarily equate to communication, although the lack 
thereof would largely make the social action senseless. Communication is not 
possible without social action that is, without it being oriented toward another 
social actor. Social action, in contrast to communication, does not necessarily 
include mutual understanding. Therefore communication is a certain kind 
of social action. Understanding of social action is based on the meaning that 
social actors give to their social actions. While meaning is characteristic of social 
action, the understanding of action is characteristic of communication. It can be 
said that social action is a necessary condition without which there can be no 
communication, but it is not a sufficient condition for enabling communication. 
Something that has begun as a social action for various reasons does not 
necessarily have to end with the mutual understanding of social actors, i.e., to 
transform into communication.
Sharlamanov Kire, Tomicic Ana: An overview of major microsociological contributions... 585
In light of the competition between macrosociology and microsociology, 
social action as it was conceived by Weber gave room to be analyzed from the 
microperception of the social actor. Moreover, social action was further developed 
from the perspective of historical macroperception. That conception was later 
used by Parsons (1962), who developed his famous and very influential theory 
of voluntary action in which communication was analyzed as a special kind of 
social coordination among social systems. According to Parsons, social action 
is composed of several interconnected social acts. Social action is taken on the 
basis of preferred goals and the orientation for their realization (Parsons 1962). 
Social actors who implement social goals can act individually or collectively. For 
Parsons, communication is a social action that involves relationships between 
at least two social actors, each of which adapts to the expectations of the other. 
The mutual understanding, adaptation and agreement are of key importance for 
communication. At the same time, Parsons puts emphasis on communication 
between social systems, neglecting the analysis of communication at the 
interpersonal level. In the analysis of communication between systems, Parsons 
includes factors such as loyalty, influence, power, or money.
In the shadow of the dominant theory of volunteer action, several 
microsociological theories appeared elaborating their own analysis of 
communication as social action. Hence, communication became over time 
an increasingly important topic both in sociology and in the social sciences. 
Thus, symbolic interactionism analyzed communication as a symbolic action, 
phenomenology analyzed communication as a social action through which one 
gains conscious experience, ethno-methodology analyzed communication as a 
practical action, social constructionism analyzed communication as the basic 
component of the social world of social actors, and theory of the communicative 
action tried to isolate communication from other types of social actions, 
indicating Its historical development in the wider social context at particular 
time intervals. All these theories fostered the emergence of new perspectives on 
communication seen as social action. We will first analyze communication as 
a joint action, to then briefly consider the perspectives from which individual 
sociological theories analyzed communication and their implications for the 
theorizing of communication.
Communication action as a joint action
As Blumer (2004: 70) defined it, a joint action is a larger collective form 
of action, constituted by the fitting together of more than one individual’s 
behavior, such as dinners, trading, weddings. Communication as a joint action 
is composed of several social acts. Thus, Mead (1934: 42) interprets gestures 
as social acts which unfold into an action, without being separated from the 
common action, but serving as stimulants. Accordingly, gestures as social acts 
are not independent, nor do they precede joint action, but on the contrary they 
are an integral part of it.
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Communication as a social action can also be analyzed as a set of social acts 
such as speaking and listening that are interconnected, as they interact with one 
another to the extent that social actors communicate in synchronized speaking, 
and listening to the responses of the other participants, i.e., social actors that 
communicate with each other are simultaneously both speakers and listeners. 
Although in principle, there should be no hierarchy amongst individual social 
acts, the focus of the social sciences has long been on the analysis of speaking as 
a social act (Austin 1962).
The first major attempt to analyze speech as a social act was made by Austin 
(1962) who developed speech act theory. According to Austin, the speech act is 
a performance and as such it is composed by perform and act. As understood 
by Austin, the function of a speech is, above all, to allow for the expression 
of the social subject, through two dimensions: the locative and the dislocative 
dimension. While the locative dimension refers to the literal meaning of the 
words used, the dislocative dimension particularly insists on the metaphorical, 
transmissive dimension of the speech act. Thus, the locative dimensions of 
the question „Where are the keys?“ is engaged in searching for them, while 
the dislocative dimension engages with the reasons the understanding reasons 
behind my question, the circumstances that led me to displace my keys, and the 
consequences of locating them.
Austin’s theory was later developed by Searle John (1999), who honored 
Austin especially for noticing the difference between the locative and the 
dislocative acts. But Searle made a serious distinction between language as a set 
of symbols and speech as the embodiment of those symbols in social life. This 
distinction was particularly convincingly shown by the founder of structuralist 
linguistics Ferdinand de Saussure (2006), according to whom speech is a 
conscious act of expression of thought, while language is an unconscious, 
impersonal and passive entity that social actors adopt, but it is very difficult 
to change. Therefore, Saussure, much like Austin and Searle, paid much more 
attention to speech than language. The linguist de Saussure, again like both 
philosophers, felt that speech cannot be reduced to a combination of symbols, 
but it is a performance that includes demands, promises, apologies, and so on. 
Mead’s position on this question is similar (Blumer 2004: 18–21). But Mead put 
more attention on the process of internalization of language which according to 
him is an evolutionary process that goes along with the evolution of gestures in 
symbols, forming through that process the mind of social actors. Mead calls this 
process of adoption of the objective structure of meaning through communication 
with others subjectivization. So subjectivization is a process in which we adopt 
dominant concepts in language as our own; or a dominant value system as our 
own value system. Mead distinguishes between the normative structure, which 
is an integral part of language and the pragmatic aspect of the speech action. 
This dichotomy was analyzed by Habermas (1998) by developing the concepts of 
universal pragmatism and formal pragmatism. Moreover, universal pragmatism 
refers to the meanings and metaphorical function of speech, while formal 
pragmatism is devoted to the evaluation of the linguistic competency of social 
actors in communication.
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According to Cooke (1998: 1–2) Habermas, unlike Austin and Searle, 
emphasizes the importance of formal pragmatism by insisting on conditions that 
need to be met by respecting the formal rules of spoken language. But, according 
to Scharp (2003: 5), the achievement of mutual understanding in communication 
goes beyond the boundaries of formal pragmatism, i.e., the purely formal rules 
of speaking, and extends to the meanings that the words or even sentences carry 
with them as a subject of analysis of universal pragmatism.
As Pusey (2003: 76) notes, that which was a combination of speaking and 
acting for Austin and Searle, was seen as communicative action for Habermas. 
In that sense, even though Habermas recognizes Austin and Searle’s contribution 
in redefining communication as not only instrumental but also performative, 
he is critical towards what he considers to bean overly superficial analysis of 
communication failing to analyze understanding as a major characteristic of 
communication. For Habermas himself, by satisfying the conditions of formal 
validity, which includes understanding, speech is spilled into communication, 
that is, formal pragmatism is infused into universal pragmatism. Ethno-
methodologists, for their part, were also placed before the dilemma for analyzing 
the formal versus informal speech. According to them, special attention 
should to be paid to the analysis of the ordinary informal speech in everyday 
communication, which is much freerthan formal speech and which enables the 
coordination of social life (Hester and Francis 2004: 8–9).
The transformation of communication from action to 
interaction
The analysis of social action as a joint action involves the interaction of 
multiple social actors in a given social context, which could be defined as an 
interaction. This transition from the analysis of the action of one toward the 
other social actors, to the analysis of the mutual reaction of the social actors 
made within the framework of symbolic interactionism also meant a transition 
to the analysis of communication as a form of social interaction. It can be said 
that social interaction through communication involves the coordination of 
social actions. While the key feature of social action is the meaning attached 
to defining the situation in which it operates, in the interaction the emphasis is 
placed on the relation that is required to be established at the moment when two 
actors act simultaneously addressing one another.
When Mead proposes interaction as an object of sociological analysis, among 
other things in the analysis of communication, he insists that social interaction is 
constitutive in relation to social action, and is not consisting of it. In our analysis, 
this would mean that relations generate meanings. More specifically, this 
means that while social interaction involves the coordination of social actions, 
social actions do not constitute social interaction, but rather social interaction 
constitutes social actions. This means that the relations between social action 
and social interaction are much more complicated, ambivalent and stratified. It 
could even be claimed that in Mead’s theory, the action and the interaction are 
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in a sort of symbiosis, unified one with another. Hence, social action itself is 
a sort of cooperation between social actors, where everyone enters with their 
predispositions and capacities taking over responsibilities for accomplishment of 
certain joint goals. These goals can be planned (i.e. explicitly set), spontaneous 
or unconscious (i.e. implicitly set). When social action occurs within social 
groups, it is related to the acting of the group. But the life of social groups cannot 
be relied upon a simple number of social actions, it is a lot more than that. For 
this reason Blumer (2004:70) uses the term “joint action”.
Symbols denote certain objects and states, as well as their characteristics and 
qualities. Accordingly, we can make a distinction between the world of subjects, 
i.e., social actors who attach meaning and the world of objects to which meanings 
are given. According to Mead objects are socially conditioned, which is the 
result of symbolic interactions (Mead 1934). Phenomenology, as a philosophical 
direction accepted in the social sciences, especially in sociology and psychology, 
tried to overcome this division of the object and subject, by introducing into the 
analysis, the conscious experience that was investigated by using the method of 
phenomenological reduction. Consciousness is awareness of something. It unites 
the subject who gives meaning, who thinks, shows emotions, believes, etc. and 
the object to which meaning is given, which is thought, toward which emotions 
are shown and that in which one believes. But such a subject that relies solely on 
the individual conscious experience is isolated within the social context. That 
is why sociologists who embraced the phenomenology of social life engaged in 
solving the puzzle of objectivization of knowledge. Objectification of knowledge, 
conditioned by several elements for which particular concepts were developed 
and which according to them took place in the process of communication.
The phenomenological approach to communication
In an attempt to objectify knowledge that is internalized by social actors, 
phenomenology has built up several concepts as prerequisites for communication, 
which overcome the isolation of the individual conscious experience:typification 
– the process of marking things; stock of knowledge – a concept of collective 
unconscious, i.e., the language in which our collective experience is imprinted and 
intersubjectivity – an inter-space that floats among individuals (Schultz 1973).
Typification can be defined as the classification of knowledge and its 
meanings. . In our consciousness, names are associated with given objects. 
Giving the meanings (meaning) of objects is most often associated with the 
names that are attached to certain objects. In our consciousness, the names of 
things are related to the objects they represent. The source of this relationship 
is experience. Transcribing Schultz’s opinion, Rogers (2003: 361–362) states that 
typification is a process that includes:
• The experience we have with a given kind of objects. The applicative character 
of experience implies awareness of the experience with given objects
• Objects have certain repetitive features. Social actors extract those 
characteristics of objects and associate them with their name
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• Thetypification refers not only to the process of marking (naming) of 
objects, but also to the results of that process that are reflected in the use 
of names from social actors
The typification process is central to communication, through which social 
actors practically engage in the social world. Namely, through typification, 
children learn how a certain combination of sounds is associated with certain 
entities and appearances. In a similar way they learn how certain typifications 
serve as a formula that leads to social action.
The stock of knowledge is a collection of collective knowledge and experiences 
that constitute collective consciousness. It is built through communication with 
other members of society in a variety of social arrangements such as family, 
friends, colleagues from work, etc. (Guff, Sharrock and Francis 2005: 154).
Social actors use a stock of knowledge, depending on the situation in which 
they are located and the needs that they should meet at a given moment. As 
Schultz (1973: 75–76), noted the use of stock of knowledge by social actors is 
incoherent andonly partly clear. Incoherent because individual aspirations, 
plans, and interests are not integrated into a coherent system. Accordingly, the 
knowledge that social actors have is only partially organized in the form of 
plans for life, work, rest, etc. It is partly clear, because people rarely and most 
often, by exception, are interested in completely clearing up any uncertainties in 
knowledge, and the principles on which things work. Simultaneously, knowledge 
is not used consistently. Namely, incompatible attitudes can be equally useful 
and used by social actors depending on the context they are in.
Intersubjectivism is the space of recognizable and understandable symbols. 
That space floats among social actors. It’s based on the typification and 
stock of knowledge and enables communication. Through intersubjectivity, 
phenomenologists have tried to overcome the difference between the individual 
experience of the social actors and the experience of the social group, 
enriching the individual consciousness of social actors with the wider social 
empirical knowledge and experience of social group that is acheived through 
communication. In the analysis of intersubjectivism, certain differences can be 
observed between classical phenomenology and its sociological reading. Namely, 
while for Husserl, intersubjectivism is an a priori characteristic of consciousness, 
for Schuildz the intersubjectivity as a characteristic of human consciousness is 
acquired in the processes of socialization (Flagerty 2009: 222). The intersubjective 
world is not limited to the knowledge and experience of individual social 
actors, but it becomes a single social world that includes all members of society, 
extending into the time continuum. Thus, interubjectivism links knowledge, 
meanings, understandings of past, current situations, and expectations of the 
future, giving space for social actors to have a subjective perspective of observing 
things in the common, inter-subjective social world.
Berger and Luckmann (1991) were strongly influenced by phenomenology 
and, in particular, Schultz and Phenomenology of Social Life, which they 
themselves recognize in the introduction to Social Construction of Reality. In 
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fact, Schultz was the mentor of the doctoral work of Berger. Flaherty (2009: 226) 
concludes that social constructivism is one of the areas in which phenomenology 
is applied. Berger and Luckman, borrowing from Schultz, developed ideas 
about the importance of experience, the stock of knowledge and typification, 
but especially intersubjectiveness. Berger and Luckmann (1991) understood 
the intersubjectivity as reciprocity and sharing of subjective experiences. In 
this way, intersubjectivity contributes to the objectivization of the subjective 
reality of individuals. According to Berger and Luckmann (1991: 71) through 
communication, the subjective experiences of individuals are shared, mixed, 
intertwined, and thus form an objectified dimension of the reality of everyday 
life, as illustrated in the following excerpt:
“I am alone in the world of my dreams, but I know that the world of 
everyday life is as real to others as it is to myself. Indeed, I cannot exist 
in everyday life without continually interacting and communicating with 
others. I know that my natural attitude to this world corresponds to the 
natural attitude of others, that they also comprehend the objectifications 
by which this world is ordered, that they also organize this world around 
the ’here and now’ of their being in it and have projects for working in it” 
(Berger and Luckmann 1991: 37).
The analysis of communication within individual sociological theories 
pointed to its significance for certain aspects of social life, but according to 
some authors like Habermas, sociology omitted to deal with the key feature of 
communication, which, according to him, is the understanding among social 
actors (Habermas 1987: 4–5).
The macrosociological consequences of communication 
action in the invisible rules of social life
Focused on a microsociological analysis of communication, Habermas 
delved into a macro level of analysis, which he also applied to communication. 
Habermas used the theory of communicative action as a platform for a critique 
of capitalism through the criticism of the instrumental action which, according to 
Weber, is the basis for the development of the capitalist socio-historical formation. 
Habermas thus insisted on a dichotomy: instrumental target-oriented action and 
communicative action oriented towards understanding (Habermas 1983).
Communication action is primary in the sense that people first understand 
through communication, and subsequently develops instrumental action in 
which communicator uses interlocutor as an instrument. Moreover, Habermas, 
in contrast to other left-wing thinkers that criticized the rationality of the 
instrumental target-oriented social action as Horkheimer and Adorno (Ingram 
1990: 63, defined the communicative action as a rational action, by modifying 
the criterion according to which the rationality of social action is determined 
(Habermas 1983:10). Thus, according to Habermas, the rationality criterion 
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of social action is the link between mind and knowledge. Accordingly, 
rational action is not only the relation between the goal and the tools for its 
achievement, but rational action can be oriented towards the understanding 
of any symbols. As Habermas noted, the difference between instrumental and 
communicational rationality is the difference between „to know-how“ and „to 
know-that“ (Habermas 1983:8). Accordingly, it is not only rational people who 
can complete a specific task, but also people who skillfully know how to use 
the language. Although his attempt to rationalize social action was subjected to 
severe criticism (Heath 2003), he nevertheless made a serious contribution to the 
understanding of communicative action. The rationalization process, according 
to Habermas, takes place in the historical continuum. In the mythical-magic 
society, the words have magic properties and there is no difference between 
communicative action and target oriented rational action (Habermas 1983: 48). 
This difference begins even in the process of demythologization of societies that 
entail the denaturalization of society and the de-socialization of nature, which 
separates man from nature and establishes the structure of formal understanding 
of things. Following its rationalization the relationship between subjects and 
objects (the names and meanings they carry with them) was replaced by the 
relationship between speech and the world (the truth of what is being said). The 
validity of this link between speech and the world was confirmed by a mix of 
practical concepts like causality.
Ethno-methodologists who were preoccupied with the analysis of 
the invisible rules of social life in their analysis particularly referred to 
communication as a practical action through which such rules are applied by 
shaping the social order. In doing so, practical action is any action that social 
actors take in their everyday lives, with the meaning they give to them. Speech 
is of particular importance as a medium used for the establishment of a social 
order. This order, inter alia, implies constellations of power in the interaction 
between social actors and applies in the establishment of knowledge, as well as 
the conditions under which the understanding between social actors is achieved. 
Communication can be said to not only establish, but also legitimize the rules of 
the social order.
Ethno-methodologists with their experiments wanted to just expose the 
invisible rules of the social order to the insight. Therefore, ethno-methodology 
suggests a three-step method for exploring practical action (Hester and Francis 
2004: 25–26). The first step is breaking the rules of everyday life, the second 
step is to observe the visible characteristics of social rules when they are 
violated and the third step is to observe the attempt to reconstruct the social 
order. Communication is the form in which these rules of everyday life exist. 
As communication is momentarily and constantly changing, the rules are 
momentary, constructed, and reconstructed at every moment in which the 
communication takes place.
Garfinkel and Sacks (1986: 159) emphasized the importance of membership 
in the group both for co-payment and for the observation of everyday life, which 
provides a set of pre-knowledge that gives logical and understandable meaning 
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to communication. In the words of Garfinkel (1967: 39–40), understanding the 
meaning of communication is much more dependent on what has not been said, 
but it should have been, than from what has been said.
The analysis of the conversation within ethno-methodology was so 
significant that over time, conversation analysis began to stand out as an 
autonomous discipline within ethno-methodology. Although conversation 
analysis had its beginnings in ethno-methodology, and the founder of the 
same Sucks, was one of the closest collaborators of the intellectual leader 
of ethnography Garfinkel, the relations between these two disciplines were 
ambivalent. On one hand, there were allegations that ethno-methodologists were 
trying to keep the conversational analysis under their own patronage (Willson 
2003), while on the other hand accusations were made that the conversation 
analysis in not researching invisible rules of social life (ten Have 2004:25).
Conversational analysis distinguishes between formal and informal 
(practical) language. While informal language is less structured and co-
ordinates, more closely, the interaction between social actors. Hester and 
Francies (2004: 8–9) note that conversational analysis does not involve the 
analysis of abstract, but of practical language. In the analysis of practical 
language, social context is important as well as to be a member of the group. 
The relations between social context and communication are complex. On the 
one hand, the social context conditions and leads the conversation; on the other 
hand, conversation can contribute to the creation or redefinition of the social 
context (Garfinkel 1967: 39–40). Being a member of the group is important 
because it provides foreknowledge from which the meaning of the conversation 
can be understood. Membership in the group gives us information about the 
relationship between social actors, their history, their characteristics, character 
traits, etc. For understanding the conversation itself, that which is not said is 
often more important, than what is said. Garfinkel and Sucks (1986: 164) present 
the following illustrative example: while not belonging to a group, we can still 
understand the semantic meaning of a simple sentence such as „she did not like 
it here and we left“. But as we are not members of the group, we do not have the 
necessary foreknowledge to understand who she is, why they did not like it, who 
are we exactly, etc.
Conclusions
In many ways, this brief journey through the complexity of issues in situations 
of interaction, the role of language activities, or the relationship between action 
contexts and social contexts will have to relativize some commonplaces often 
mentioned about communication. But above all, it will have led to experiencing 
the limits of certain dichotomous oppositions, which to this day, seem to be a law 
in some models of discourse.Ultimately, the choice of re-inscribing sociological 
research in Max Weber’s tradition of comprehensive sociology has no effect on 
the falling back of sociological research on micro-social phenomena that would 
leave it out of all major social discussions. On the contrary, this choice seems to 
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open up to research the possibilities of generalizations, and which will at least 
have the advantage to rely on minute descriptions of the singular phenomena 
on which they are based. The key point that has always puzzled sociologists, 
and where they have no other means of understanding and analyzing social 
phenomena than those used by social actors to produce and recognize their 
activities, is not necessarily a nuisance. Once one proposes to recognize as 
systematically as possible the nature of these resources that belong to the very 
nature of social activity, we realize, as Weber had seen, that it is necessarily 
oriented towards others.
In this confrontation, we do find a few landmarks in the analysis of a situated 
interaction, but a deeper reconfiguration of the field of discourse analysis seems 
necessary. To overcome these limitations, a reconfiguration which presupposes, 
in particular, a better integration of the processes of representation and mediation 
of action, a finer description of the conceptual and procedural dimensions of 
the action, and a more explicit consideration of the multimodal character of 
discursive productions. These are all challenges for the future of a discipline, 
which ultimately constitute the methodological and epistemological conditions 
to which the theories of communication must submit in order to conceptualize 
effectively the relations between action, discourse and communication.
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